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1 Introduction
Risk aversion governs many parts of economic behavior. However, it has to be
complemented by the higher-order risk preferences prudence and temperance if one
wants to explain important economic phenomena such as precautionary saving or
prevention efforts. Consider a decision maker (DM) whose income is the same now
and at a future point in time, and who just learned that she will face a zero-mean risk
at the later point in time. According to expected utility (EU) theory, the DM should
reduce current consumption and increase savings (i.e., save precautionary) if his
future expected marginal utility is higher than his present marginal utility, i.e. if he
has a convex marginal utility (u000 [ 0), a property typically called (risk) prudence
(Leland 1968; Kimball 1990). This result illustrates the importance of risk attitudes
in economic decision making beyond risk aversion.
For long, the literature on higher order risk preferences remained purely
theoretical (Leland 1968; Sandmo 1970; Kimball 1990, 1993). Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006) were the first to propose behavioral, testable conditions of higher
order risk preferences that made experimental investigation of these attitudes
possible. For instance, one can test whether the DM is risk prudent if he prefers
adding a zero-mean risk to a high income state rather than to a low income state.
The DM is risk temperate (fourth order, u(4)\ 0 under EU) if he prefers to
disaggregate independent zero-mean risks across equiprobable states of nature. The
conditions proposed by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) led to many measure-
ments in the laboratory and in the field, generally finding strong evidence for risk
prudence and, to a lesser extent, for risk temperance (Tarazona-Gomez 2004; Deck
and Schlesinger 2010, 2014; Ebert and Wiesen 2011, 2014; Noussair et al. 2014;
Maier and Ru¨ger 2012).
The literature mentioned above only concerns objectively known probabilities.
However, such probabilities are unavailable in many important economic situations
(Knight 1921). People have been found to dislike the absence of objective
probabilities, exhibiting ambiguity aversion. Since Ellsberg (1961) proposed his
famous paradox, empirical studies of ambiguity preferences have virtually all been
restricted to studying the causes and prevalence of ambiguity aversion (e.g., see
Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015).
This paper explores attitudes toward ambiguity beyond aversion. Ambiguity
prudence is a preference for combining ambiguity with states of the world yielding a
high chance of a good outcome, rather than with states yielding a low chance of a
good outcome. An ambiguity temperate DM dislikes facing two sources of
ambiguity at the same time, and prefers to disaggregate them (for details, see
Sect. 2).
Experimental evidence about higher order ambiguity attitudes is necessary to
complement the recent theoretical literature that highlighted the importance of these
concepts. For example, ambiguity prudence has been found to play a key role in
models of survival of ambiguity averse agents on a market (Guerdjikova and
Sciubba 2015) and of prevention behavior (Baillon 2017). Ambiguity prudence is
necessary and sufficient for future ambiguity to trigger an increase in prevention
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efforts, e.g., an ambiguity prudent DM would rather get a vaccine against a new
(‘‘ambiguous’’) disease than against a well-known disease with the same average
severity and incidence (Baillon 2017).1 Moreover, specifications of popular
ambiguity models (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989; Schmeidler 1989; Hansen and
Sargent 2001; Ghirardato et al. 2004; Klibanoff et al. 2005) that are widely used in
applications imply ambiguity prudence. A policy maker who makes robust
decisions in the sense of Hansen and Sargent (2007) is ambiguity prudent and
ambiguity temperate. Despite the theoretical importance of higher order ambiguity
attitudes for economic decision making, there is no evidence regarding the
prevalence of higher order ambiguity attitudes in the population.
This paper is the first to investigate higher-order ambiguity preferences
empirically. First, we develop an experimental methodology to implement the
preference conditions proposed by Baillon (2017). Second, we embed our tests in a
more general experiment, also measuring ambiguity aversion and higher order risk
preferences (risk aversion, risk prudence and risk temperance). This allows us to
investigate the relationship between these attitudes, and to test whether both these
preferences stem from combining good outcomes with bad outcomes, as recently
conjectured by Crainich et al. (2013) and observed by Deck and Schlesinger (2014).
Our results show clear support for ambiguity prudence, thereby confirming the
predictions of several ambiguity models. Our findings further support, to a lesser
extent, ambiguity temperance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present the theoretical foundation of our measurements of higher order ambiguity
attitudes. Section 3 describes the design of our experiment. The results are
presented in Sect. 4 and are discussed in Sect. 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Higher order preferences
2.1 Order 2: aversion
A DM is facing a choice between two 50–50 lotteries Ar2 : (x – k1 – k2, x) and
Br2 : (x – k1, x – k2) for some x, k1, k2[ 0.
2 In lottery Br2, the two losses (two
‘‘harms’’) –k1 and –k2 are ‘‘disaggregated’’, i.e., one of them occurs only if the other
does not. By contrast, the harms are aggregated in lottery Ar2. Risk aversion can be
defined as preferring Br2 to Ar2 for all W, k1, and k2. Hence, risk averters prefer
disaggregating the two harms. Under EU, it is equivalent to u00 \ 0. Risk lovers
always prefer Ar2 to Br2 and therefore satisfy u
00 [ 0 under EU. We used 50–50
lotteries in the definition to show the similarity with the definitions that will follow.
Of course, Ar2 can be any lottery and Br2 its expected value. We write (p: x, y) to
1 These results can be contrasted with those obtained for ambiguity aversion. Alary et al. (2013) provided
conditions in which ambiguity aversion may actually decrease prevention efforts.
2 Throughout, we only consider lotteries leading to positive final wealth, to avoid bankruptcy
considerations.
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refer to binary lotteries yielding x with probability p and y otherwise. If p is omitted,
then it is 50%.
Consider a DM facing the following variant of the Ellsberg paradox, based on the
deck of 8 cards depicted in Fig. 1. Half of the cards are King, the other half are
Queen. Yet, the color of the cards (red or black) is not known and neither is the
process determining the color. This situation corresponds to ambiguity. The only
information is that either all cards are red or all cards are black. The DM can pick a
color, and wins €30 if he draws a card of the picked color (bet A) or he may win €30
if he draws a King from the deck (bet B). Hence, bet B gives 50% to win while bet
A gives either 0 or 100%.
Let ({p, q}: x, y) describe a bet in which one state of nature (e.g., one possible
composition of the deck) gives a probability p of winning x (and y\ x otherwise)
and the only other possible state of nature gives a probability q of winning the same
prize x (and y otherwise). In the remainder, when using the notation {p, q}, we will
assume informational symmetry: the DM does not have information favoring one of
the two states over the other. Bet A can be represented by ({0%,100%}: €30, €0)
and bet B by ({50%, 50%}: €30, €0) (whatever the state of nature, i.e., whatever the
color composition of the deck, the probability of winning is 50%). Preferring bet B,
with the known probability of winning x, to bet A is interpreted as ambiguity
aversion. Consider the pair of bets Aa2 and Ba2 defined by Aa2 : ({p – q1 – q2, p}:
x, y) and Ba2 : ({p – q1, p – q2}: x, y), with x[ y, 0 B p B 1, q1[ 0, q2[ 0, and
p – q1 – q2 C 0. We call –q1 and –q2 probability losses, i.e. reductions of the
probability of winning. Ambiguity aversion can be characterized as preferring Ba2 to
Aa2 for all such pairs of bets. It can be seen as aversion toward mean preserving
spreads in winning probabilities. The opposite preference is called ambiguity loving.
Many models have been proposed to accommodate ambiguity aversion. Among
others, maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), Choquet expected
utility with convex capacities (Schmeidler 1989), variational preferences (Mac-
cheroni et al. 2006) all predict a preference for Ba2 in the choice described above.
Klibanoff et al. (2005) introduced a smooth model of ambiguity attitudes, which is
close in spirit to EU. Consider a pair of bets Aa2 and Ba2. The smooth model
involves three functions: a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function u that we
scale such that u(y) = 0 and u(x) = 1; a subjective probability function l over the
possible states of nature, and a smooth ambiguity attitude function u. According to
the smooth model, Aa2 and Ba2 are evaluated by l(p – q1 – q2)u(p – q1 –
K K K Q Q QK Q
Fig. 1 Deck of cards to test ambiguity aversion. Note: The dashed lines indicate that either all cards are
red or all cards are black
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q2) ? l(p)u(p) and l(p – q1)u(p – q1) ? l(p – q2)u(p – q2) respectively. From
informational symmetry, we obtain l(p) = l(p – q1 – q2) = l(p – q1) = l(p –
q2) = 0.5 and therefore, that ambiguity aversion is equivalent to u00 \ 0.
2.2 Order 3: prudence
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) showed how to define higher order risk attitudes
as a preference for disaggregating harms. Consider a choice between Ar3 : (x,
x ? ~e1 – k2) and Br3 : (x ? ~e1, x – k2), with ~e1 a zero-mean risk. The two 50–50
lotteries involve a loss – k2 and another ‘‘harm’’, the zero-mean risk ~e1. Risk
prudence can be defined as always preferring Br3 to Ar3 for all x, ~e1, and k2, hence
preferring disaggregating the two harms. The DM would rather bear the loss in the
situation in which he does not bear the risk. Under EU, it is equivalent to u000 [ 0.
A DM always preferring Ar3 to Br3 is called risk imprudent and will satisfy u
000 \ 0.
Consider the deck depicted in Fig. 2, with 8 cards which are either all red or all
black. Furthermore, we know that there are two kings and two queens in the deck,
and that the four other cards are either all jacks or all aces. The DM wins €30 if he
draws a king, a black queen or a red jack from the deck. This can be written as
({50%, 25% ? {0%, 50%}}: €30, €0). In one state of nature (if the cards are black),
he has a 50% chance of winning (there are kings and queens in the deck). In the
other state of nature (red cards), he has a 25% chance of winning (there are two
kings in the eight cards) plus an additional chance of winning depending on two
independent states of nature, i.e., the absence or presence of jacks {0, 50%}. Now
imagine that the DM must give up a possibility of winning: either he does not win if
a red king is drawn or he does not win if a black king is drawn from the deck. If he
gives up ‘‘red king’’ the bet becomes ({50%, 0% ? {0%, 50%}}: €30, €0). If he
gives up ‘‘black king’’ it becomes ({25%, 25% ? {0%, 50%}}: €30, €0). In other
words, the DM has to choose whether he should aggregate or disaggregate a 25%
probability loss with the presence of ambiguity ({0, 50%}). An ambiguity prudent
DM would rather disaggregate the two harms (probability loss and jack-related
ambiguity) and therefore chooses to give up the black king.
Consider the general pair of bets Aa3 and Ba3 defined by Aa3 : ({p, p – q2 ? {–
t, t}}: x, y) and Ba3 : ({p – q2, p ? {–t, t}}: x, y) with x[ y, 0 B p B 1, q2[ 0,
t[ 0, p ? t B 1 and p – q2 – t C 0. Ambiguity prudence is characterized by
preferring Ba3 to Aa3 for all such pairs of bets. The opposite preference is called
ambiguity imprudence. Baillon (2017) showed that ambiguity prudence is
K K Q
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J
Fig. 2 Deck of cards to test ambiguity prudence. Note: the dashed lines indicate that either all cards are
red or all cards are black
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equivalent to u000[ 0 in the smooth model and that some popular specifications of
other ambiguity models predict ambiguity prudence: e.g., Hansen and Sargent’s
(2001) multiplier preferences, Chateauneuf et al.’s (2007) Choquet expected utility
with neoadditive capacities, maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989)
for some specific sets of priors.
2.3 Order 4: temperance
To define the fourth order of risk attitude, let us consider two independent zero-
mean risks ~e1 and ~e2 and define Ar4 : (x, x ? ~e1 ? ~e2) and Br4 : (x ? ~e1, x ? ~e2).
A DM is risk temperate if and only if he prefers Br4 to Ar4 for all x, ~e1, and ~e2. Such a
DM rather disaggregates the two (harmful) risks. The opposite preference is called
risk intemperance. Risk (in)temperance is equivalent to u(4)\ ([) 0 under EU
(Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 2006).
Risk temperance is defined as a preference for disaggregating two independent
zero-mean risks. Ambiguity temperance can similarly be defined as a preference for
disaggregating two informationally-symmetric ambiguities. Consider the deck
depicted in Fig. 3. Two cards may be aces and two may be kings. The DM wins €30
if he draws a red ace, a red king, a black 9 or a black 8 from the deck. This can be
written as ({1/4, 1/4 ? {–1/8, 1/8} ? {–1/8, 1/8}}: €30, 0). In one state of nature (if
the cards are black), the DM has a 25% chance of winning because there is one 9
and one 8 in the deck. In the other state of nature (red cards), the winning
probability can be 0% (two jacks and two queens), 25% (two jacks and two kings or
two aces and two queens), or 50% (two aces and two kings). Now imagine that the
DM can choose to win €30 if he draws a red ace, a red 8, a black 9 or a black king
from the deck instead. This can be written as ({1/4 ? {–1/8, 1/8}, 1/4 ? {–1/8,
1/8}}: €30, 0). Thus, the choice amounts to whether the DM would rather have the
chance of winning depend on the presence of aces and kings if the cards are black,
or have it depend on aces if the cards are black and kings if they are red (keeping the
average chance of winning constant across colors). In other words, the DM has to
choose if he prefers to aggregate or disaggregate the ambiguity regarding the
presence of aces with the ambiguity regarding the presence of kings in the deck. An
ambiguity temperate DM would rather disaggregate these informationally symmet-
ric ambiguities, i.e., prefer ({1/4 ? {–1/8, 1/8}, 1/4 ? {–1/8, 1/8}}: €30, 0) over
({1/4, 1/4 ? {–1/8, 1/8} ? {–1/8, 1/8}}: €30, 0).
7 8 10
A
or
J
A
or
J
K
or
Q
9
K
or
Q
Fig. 3 Deck of cards to test ambiguity temperance. Note: the dashed lines indicate that either all cards
are red or all cards are black
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More generally, define a pair of bets Aa4 and Ba4 by Aa4 : ({p, p ? {–t, t} ? {–
s, s}}: x, y) and Ba4 : ({p ? {–t, t}, p ? {–s, s}}: x, y) with x[ y, 0 B p B 1,
t[ 0, s[ 0, p ? t ? s B 1 and p – t – s C 0. Ambiguity temperance is defined as
preferring Ba4 to Aa4 for all such pairs of bets. The opposite preference is called
ambiguity intemperance. Ambiguity temperance is equivalent to u(4)\ 0 in the
smooth model.
In the definitions of ambiguity aversion, prudence, and temperance, we used
binary spreads in probabilities (e.g. {–t, t}). Baillon (2017) showed that the
definitions can also be adapted to series of such spreads. For instance, in the
example for ambiguity prudence, we described a deck in which four cards (out of
eight) were either jacks or aces and we denoted the ambiguity related to betting on
jacks {0, 50%}. We can replace this example by a deck in which each of the four
cards can be either an ace or a jack. In such a case, we will write [0, 50%], to
indicate that intermediary probabilities are also possible.
2.4 Mixed attitudes
We presented the risk apportionments of order 2, 3, and 4 and their equivalent for
ambiguity, thereby illustrating the link between risk and ambiguity for each order.
We now turn to the link between the various orders. The definitions of aversion,
prudence, and temperance all relied on a preference for disaggregating harms.
Under EU for risk, risk apportionment of order n for n = 2 to 4 is equivalent to sgn
u(n) = (-1)n?1 as shown by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). A function
satisfying this property for all n was called mixed risk averse by Caballe´ and
Pomansky (1996). Crainich et al. (2013) called mixed risk loving a utility function
whose successive derivatives are all positive. They show that such a utility is
equivalent to always preferring combining good with good (and bad with bad). At
order 2, it implies risk seeking (preferring the aggregation of the losses in Fig. 1a).
Hence, risks are ‘‘good.’’ At order 3, it surprisingly implies risk prudence because
the DM prefers combining the ‘‘good’’ risk with the high outcome. At order 4, it
implies risk intemperance (preferring the aggregation of the ‘‘good’’ risks).
Let us extend the analysis to the domain of ambiguity in the framework of the
smooth model. In particular, let us call mixed ambiguity averse a smooth ambiguity
function u satisfying sgn u(n) = (-1)n?1 and mixed ambiguity loving a smooth
ambiguity function u satisfying sgn u(n) = 1. Mixed ambiguity aversion implies
ambiguity aversion, prudence, and temperance and can be explained by a preference
for combining good with bad. Mixed ambiguity loving implies ambiguity loving,
prudence, and intemperance and can be explained by a preference for combining
good with good.
If people either have a general tendency for combining good with bad or a
tendency for combining good with good, then mixed risk averse (loving) DMs
should also be mixed ambiguity averse (loving). Table 1 describes the two types of
DMs that should then be observed.
Measuring higher order ambiguity preferences 239
123
3 Experimental design
One hundred ninety-nine students from Erasmus University Rotterdam participated
in a computerized experiment, which was conducted at the ESE-econlab. Subjects
were recruited among a pool of volunteers and were told the experiment could last
up to 1 h 15 min. They were told they would receive a €5 participation fee and that
they could additionally earn from €0 to €45. The subjects could expect earning
€23.50 in total. Each session involved between 23 and 28 subjects. The mean age of
subjects was 22 years, 62% were studying economics or finance (38% other social
sciences), and 38% were female.
The experiment consisted of 2 parts and each part of 15 choices. One part
involved the elicitation of attitudes towards risk, the other part involved the
elicitation of attitudes towards ambiguity. Each part started with instructions, read
out aloud by the experimenter. In four sessions, subjects first made the risky choices
and then the ambiguity choices. In the other four sessions, the order of the parts was
reversed. Within each part, the order of the choices varied across sessions, but this
order was the same for all subjects in a given session.
The 30 choice tasks are described in Table 2. The tasks were selected to allow for
comparability between the risk tasks and the ambiguity tasks. For instance, as
Table 2 shows, options A in the tasks used to measure risk aversion (tasks 1–5) were
used as options B in the tasks measuring ambiguity aversion (tasks 16–20).
Each experimental task corresponded to a deck of cards, which was prepared
before the experiment and stored in a sealed envelope. The decks were described to
the subject. For instance, Fig. 4 shows the deck of tasks 8 and 23 (from Table 2).
For task 8 (Fig. 4a), six cards were red and two were black. Two cards were aces
and six cards were 9 s. For task 23 (Fig. 4b), the deck contained eight cards, two of
which were 8 s and two others were 9 s. The other four cards could be Kings or
Queens, representing a first source of ambiguity. The dashed line depicting the cards
indicated that it was unknown whether all cards were red or all cards were black,
creating a second source of ambiguity.
Together with Figs. 4a, and 5a was presented to subjects for task 8. In Fig. 5a,
option A was presented as option L and option B as option R (in four of the eight
Table 1 Combining good with bad or good with good
Prefer combining good with bad Prefer combining good with good
Mixed risk averse
Risk averse (u00 \ 0)
Risk prudent (u0 0 0[ 0)
Risk temperate (u(4)\ 0)
Mixed risk loving
Risk loving (u00[ 0)
Risk prudent (u0 0 0 [ 0)
Risk intemperate (u(4)[ 0)
Mixed ambiguity averse
Ambiguity averse (u00 \ 0)
Ambiguity prudent (u0 0 0[ 0)
Ambiguity temperate (u(4)\ 0)
Mixed ambiguity loving
Ambiguity loving (u00 [ 0)
Ambiguity prudent (u0 0 0 [ 0)
Ambiguity intemperate (u(4)[ 0)
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Table 2 Choice tasks
Task Dom Order Option A Option B EV
1 Risk 2 (1/2: €30, €0) €15 €15
2 Risk 2 (1/2: €45, €15) = 1A ? €15 1B ? €15 €30
3 Risk 2 (1/2: €45, €0) = 1A 9 1.5 1B 9 1.5 €22.5
4 Risk 2 (1/3: €30, €0) €10 €10
5 Risk 2 (2/3: €30, €0) €20 €20
6 Risk 3 (1/2: €15, €7.5 ? ~e1) with ~e1 = (1/2:
€7.5, -€7.5)
(1/2: €15 ? ~e1, €7.5) €11.25
7 Risk 3 6A ? €15 6B ? €15 €26.25
8 Risk 3 6A 9 2 6B 9 2 €22.5
9 Risk 3 (1/2: €10, €5 ? ~e2) with ~e2 = (1/3:
€10, -€5)
(1/2: €10 ? ~e2, €5) €7.5
10 Risk 3 (1/2: €25, €10 ? ~e3) with ~e3 = (2/3:
€5, -€10)
(1/2: €25 ? ~e3, €10) €17.5
11 Risk 4 (1/2: €15, €15 ? ~e1 ? ~e1) (1/2: €15 ? ~e1, €15 ? ~e1) €15
12 Risk 4 11A ? €15 11B ? €15 €30
13 Risk 4 11A 9 1.5 11B 9 1.5 €22.5
14 Risk 4 (1/2: €10, €10 ? ~e2 ? ~e2) (1/2: €10 ? ~e2, €10 ? ~e2) €10
15 Risk 4 (1/2: €20, €20 ? ~e3 ? ~e3) (1/2: €20 ? ~e3, €20 ? ~e3) €20
16 Amb 2 ([0, 1]: €30, €0) 1A €15
17 Amb 2 16A ? €15 2A €30
18 Amb 2 ({0, 1}: €45, €0) 3A €22.5
19 Amb 2 ([0, 2/3]: €30, €0) 4A €10
20 Amb 2 ([1/3, 1]: €30, €0) 5A €20
21 Amb 3 ({1/2, 1/4 ? [-1/4, 1/4]}: €30, €0) ({1/4, 1/2 ? [-1/4, 1/4]}: €30, €0) €11.25
22 Amb 3 21A ? €15 21B ? €15 €26.25
23 Amb 3 21A 9 1.5 21B 9 1.5 €16.88
24 Amb 3 ({1/3, 1/6 ? [-1/6, 1/6]}: €30, €0) ({1/6, 1/3 ? [-1/6, 1/6]}: €30, €0) €7.5
25 Amb 3 ({2/3, 1/2 ? [-1/6, 1/6]}: €30, €0) ({1/2, 2/3 ? [-1/6, 1/6]}: €30, €0) €17.5
26 Amb 4 ({1/2, 1/2 ? [-1/8, 1/8] ? [-1/8,
1/8]}: €30, €0)
({1/2 ? [-1/8, 1/8], 1/2 ? [-1/8,
1/8]}: €30, €0)
€15
27 Amb 4 26A ? €15 26B ? €15 €30
28 Amb 4 26A 9 1.5 26B 9 1.5 €22.5
29 Amb 4 ({1/3, 1/3 ? [-1/6, 1/6] ? [-1/6,
1/6]}: €30, €0)
({1/3 ? [-1/6, 1/6], 1/3 ? [-1/6,
1/6]}: €30, €0)
€10
30 Amb 4 ({2/3, 2/3 ? [-1/6, 1/6] ? [-1/6,
1/6]}: €30, €0)
({2/3 ? [-1/6, 1/6], 2/3 ? [-1/6,
1/6]}: €30, €0)
€20
Table 1 gives, for each decision task, the two options subjects were asked to choose from. Tasks 1–15 are
tasks related to risk attitude, and 16–30 to ambiguity attitude. The order (2 = aversion, 3 = prudence, or
4 = temperance) is reported in the third column. Column 4 describes option A and column 5 option B.
The last column gives the expected value, which was the same for both options of a given task. For
example, in Task 2, option B is described as 1B ? €15, which means option B of Task 1 plus €15, so €30.
Option A of Task 24 described as ({1/3, 1/6 ? [-1/6, 1/6]}: €30, €0) yields €30 with a probability either
of 1/3 or between 0 and 1/3
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sessions, L and R were reversed). With 50% chance, option A yielded €30 and with
50%, it yielded €15 and ±€15 (with equal probability). Lotteries were presented in
a reduced form and therefore, the subjects were told that option L would give €30
with 75% chance and €0 otherwise.
Presenting reduced lotteries is a departure from most previous experimental
investigations of higher order risk preferences. We did so because Halevy (2007)
and Abdellaoui et al. (2015) found that ambiguity aversion is associated (strongly
for the former study, weakly for the latter) with non-reduction of compound
lotteries. Hence, we expected that presenting the lotteries in a non-reduced form
could contaminate higher order risk preferences with violations of lottery reduction,
and artificially inflate the association between higher order risk preferences and
higher order ambiguity preferences. An important consequence of using reduced
forms is that losses were not displayed as such but integrated into the final outcome
(for instance, in Fig. 5a, the ±€15 risk never implies a net loss). Haering et al.
(2017) found that DMs exhibit less prudence and temperance when lotteries are
presented in their reduced form.
For task 23, the subjects saw on their computer screen both Figs. 4b and 5b (and
some explanation). In both options, they would win €45 if a black King or a red 9
was drawn. In Option L (representing Option A of Table 2), they would also win if a
red 8 was drawn and in Option R, if a black 8 was drawn. If the deck of Fig. 4b was
composed of red cards, then Option L had a winning probability of 1/2, but if the
deck is composed of black cards, the deck had a winning probability between 0 (if
there was no king) and 1/2 (if there were four Kings). This implements ({1/2,
Fig. 4 Decks for two prudence tasks. a Risk (task 8) and b Ambiguity (task 23)
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1/4 ? [-1/4,1/4]}: €45, €0). Option R similarly implements ({1/4, 1/2 ? [-1/4,1/
4]}: €45, €0).
A potential problem in ambiguity tasks is suspicion: subjects may think that the
experimenters have manipulated the likelihood that particular unknown events are
realized to minimize the cost of the experiment. To avoid suspicion playing a role in
the experiment, subjects were allowed to permute all ambiguous events. For
example, in task 23, subjects could permute Kings and Queens and/or red and black.
Since the decks were prepared before the experiment, the experimenters could not
be suspected of strategic behavior. This possibility was also crucial to ensure that
the subjects consider the various ambiguities to be informationally symmetric. They
had no reason to believe that one color was more likely to be drawn than the other
(see Sect. 3 for a further discussion).
Subjects were paid according to one of their choices in one randomly selected
task. The implementation of random incentives can create issues in ambiguity
experiments by offering the possibility for the subjects to hedge against ambiguity
(e.g., Oechssler and Roomets 2014). In our experiment, each task concerned a
different deck of cards and therefore, a different source of ambiguity. Hence, the
random incentives did not provide a hedging possibility.
Fig. 5 Choice options for two prudence tasks. a Risk prudence (task 8) and b Ambiguity prudence (task
23)
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The incentives were implemented as follows. At the beginning of the session, one
envelope was randomly drawn (by a subject) from a pile of 30 envelopes containing
a decision task each. Subjects were told that the envelope (signed by the subject to
identify it) would be opened at the end of the session and that the task it contains
would be played for real money. This approach can enhance isolation (Johnson et al.
2014), making it clear that only one task is used for payment. Once the envelope
was opened, the corresponding deck was mixed, and a subject drew a card from the
deck. Payoffs were then determined and implemented.
4 Results
4.1 Order 2: aversion
In line with Noussair et al. (2014) and Deck and Schlesinger (2014), we use the
number of choices (out of 5) that subjects answered in a risk/ambiguity averse way
as our (model-free) measurement of risk-and ambiguity preferences. Figure 6
presents the distribution of risk (left) and ambiguity (right) averse choices the 199
participants made in the experiment.
First, as the figure shows and in line with previous literature, the majority of
choices in the experiment is consistent with risk aversion. On average, subjects
chose the risk averse option 4.20 out of 5 times, which is significantly different from
the average that would be observed if subjects chose randomly (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test,3 p value\ 0.01). More than half of the subjects (57%) chose the risk
averse option in all 5 choices. In addition, the observed distribution of risk averse
choices is significantly different what would be observed if subjects chose randomly
(v2 test, p-value\ 0.01).
As the right panel of the Fig. 6 suggests, we also observe ambiguity aversion. On
average, subjects chose the ambiguity averse option 2.95 out of 5 times, which is
significantly different from random choice (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-
value\ 0.01). In addition, the observed distribution of ambiguity averse choices
is significantly different from the distribution that would be observed if subjects
chose randomly (v2 test, p-value\ 0.01).
Note that ambiguity aversion appears to be less pronounced than risk aversion.
The main reason for this finding is the fact that a vast majority (142 out of 199) of
subjects preferred the ambiguity seeking option in Task 19, i.e., when the
probability of winning was in [0, 2/3]. This finding corroborates the commonly
found ambiguity seeking preference for lower likelihoods (see Trautmann and van
de Kuilen 2015 for a summary of the experimental findings), and shows that
assuming universal ambiguity aversion might be problematic from a descriptive
point of view. Figure 7 displays the proportion of ambiguity averse choices
excluding Task 19, i.e. for choices involving intermediate or high likelihoods. In
3 All Wilcoxon signed-rank tests reported in this section are based on the number of times subjects chose
the averse/prudent/temperate option compared to 2.5. All Wilcoxon signed-rank test results are replicated
with Fisher-Pitman permutation tests.
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this case, a majority of subjects (57%) chose the ambiguity averse lottery 3 or 4
times out of 4.
4.2 Order 3: prudence
Figure 8 presents the distribution of risk- and ambiguity prudent choices that we
observed in the experiment based on 199 subjects, as well as the distribution that
would be observed if subjects chose randomly (solid line).
First, we corroborate the common finding in the field that decision makers are
risk prudent. On average, subjects chose the risk prudent option 3.54 out of 5 times,
which is significantly different from the average that would be observed if subjects
chose randomly (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value\ 0.01). In addition, the
observed distribution of risk prudent choices is significantly different what would be
observed if subjects chose randomly (v2 test, p-value\ 0.01).
More interestingly, we confirm a strong preference for prudent options for ambiguity.
On average, subjects chose the ambiguity prudent lottery 3.10 out of 5 times, which is
significantly different from random choice (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-
value = 0.01). In addition, the observed distribution of ambiguity prudent choices is
significantly different what would be observed if subjects chose randomly (v2 test, p-
value\ 0.01). Thus, on average, subjects prefer to disaggregate a fixed probability loss
and an informationally symmetric ambiguity, i.e., they can better cope with ambiguity if
the wining probability is high, which implies that u000[ 0 in the smooth model.
4.3 Order 4: temperance
Figure 9 presents the distribution of risk- and ambiguity temperate choices that
subjects made. As the figure shows, we observe significant risk intemperance.
Subjects chose the risk temperate lottery 2.14 times on average, which is
0
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0.2
0.3
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0.5
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# Risk Averse
0
0.1
0.2
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0 1 2 3 4 5
# Ambiguity Averse
Fig. 6 Distribution of risk- (left) and ambiguity- (right) averse choices. Note: The solid line indicates the
frequency with which a given number of choices would be expected to occur if each subjects chose
randomly
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significantly less than the average that would be expected if subjects chose
randomly (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value\ 0.01). Moreover, the observed
distribution of risk temperate choices is significantly different what would be
observed if subjects chose randomly (v2 test, p-value\ 0.01).
The observed preference for aggregating risks does not extend to ambiguity, as
the right panel of Fig. 9 shows. On average, subjects chose the ambiguity temperate
option 2.91 out of 5 times, which is significantly different from random choice
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value\ 0.01), and the observed distribution of
ambiguity temperate choices is significantly different from the distribution that
would be observed if subjects chose randomly (v2 test, p-value\ 0.01). Our results
thus indicate that subjects exhibit a preference to disaggregate independent
informationally symmetric ambiguities, implying a negative fourth derivative of u
in the smooth model.
0
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0.4
0 1 2 3 4
# Ambiguity Averse
Fig. 7 Distribution of
ambiguity-averse choices for
intermediate and high
likelihoods. Note: The solid line
indicates the frequency with
which a given number of
choices would be expected to
occur if each subjects chose
randomly
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Fig. 8 Distribution of risk- (left) and ambiguity- (right) prudent choices. Note: The solid line indicates
the frequency with which a given number of choices would be expected to occur if each subjects chose
randomly
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4.4 Regression analysis
To investigate the determinants of higher order ambiguity attitudes, we run logistic
regressions4 on choices, with a preference for Option A coded as 0 and for Option B
coded as 1. Hence the regression results can be interpreted in terms of probability to
choose the averse/prudent/temperate option. Our regression models include no
constant, i.e., all coefficients equal to zero would imply random choice. Table 3
reports the results in terms of marginal effects.
In Model 1, we regress choices on binary variables capturing whether these
choices concern aversion, prudence or temperance, under risk or under ambiguity. It
confirms the result of the non-parametric analysis, in the sense that subjects prefer
the averse/prudent/temperate option in all choices, except the risk temperate ones,
where we observe risk intemperance. In Model 2, we interact the variables of Model
1 with a variable capturing whether the ambiguity part preceded the risk part or not.
Starting with the ambiguity choices reduced ambiguity prudence and ambiguity
temperance but did not reverse the choices. Model 3 shows that having the
temperate option on the left made subjects choose it less often. Models 4 and 5
interact the variables of Model 1 with gender (being a male) and study field
(studying economics or finance). It shows that the preference for risk intemperance
is gender-specific: men are significantly intemperate. Thus, the often-observed
gender difference in risk aversion, with men being inclined to take more risks than
women (e.g., Croson and Gneezy 2009), appears to extend to temperance: compared
to females, males exhibit a stronger preference towards aggregating independent
zero mean risks. This result is consistent with Noussair et al. (2014), who observe
that women are significantly more temperate than men in a representative sample of
the Dutch population. Model 6 includes all variables. It confirms the effects
previously described. The coefficient for risk temperance is positive (marginally
0
0.1
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0.3
0.4
0 1 2 3 4 5
# Risk Temperate
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 1 2 3 4 5
# Ambiguity Temperate
Fig. 9 Distribution of risk- (left) and ambiguity- (right) temperate choices. Note: The solid line indicates
the frequency with which a given number of choices would be expected to occur if each subjects chose
randomly
4 Clustering standard errors at the individual level. All results were the same with probit regressions (see
Appendix C of electronic supplementary material).
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significant) while it was negative for Model 1. This means that the reference
category exhibited slight risk temperance but this concerns a very small sample.5
To further understand the determinants of choice behavior, we run a similar
regression on the characteristics of the lotteries6 and the subjects (Model 7 in
Table 4). In all the choices of the experiment, both options had the same expected
value. However, the higher this shared expected value, the less likely the subjects
were to choose the averse/prudent/temperate option. Unsurprisingly, subjects were
more likely to choose these options, the higher the standard deviation of the
alternative option. The third variable of Model 7 is the skewness of the averse/
prudent/temperate option minus the skewness of the alternative option. The larger
the skewness difference, the more subjects chose the averse/prudent/temperate
option. This is consistent with preferring positively skewed options to negatively
skewed ones, as observed by others (e.g., Ebert and Wiesen 2011). Finally, subjects
disliked higher kurtosis. We found a small gender effect, and having the averse/
prudent/temperate option displayed on the left made subjects choose it less. From
Table 3, we know that these effects are mainly driven by temperance.
Table 4 Determinants of risk averse/prudent/temperate choices
Model 7
Expected value of both options -0.01*** (0.00)
Standard deviation of alternative option 0.03*** (0.00)
Skewness difference 0.18*** (0.02)
Kurtosis difference 0.06*** (0.01)
Age -0.00 (0.00)
Male -0.05** (0.03)
Studying economics or finance 0.01 (0.02)
Ambiguity first -0.01 (0.02)
Averse/prudent/temperate option on the left -0.07*** (0.02)
v2 271.48***
N 2970
The table reports marginal effects of logistic regressions, followed by standard errors between brackets;
skewness difference is the difference in skewness between the averse/prudent/temperate option and the
seeking/imprudent/intemperate option; kurtosis difference is the difference in kurtosis between the
seeking/imprudent/intemperate and the averse/prudent/temperate option
* p\ 0.1
** p\ 0.05
*** p\ 0.01
5 It concerns female participants who did not study finance nor economics, started with the risk tasks and
had the temperate option on the right of the screen.
6 The characteristics of the lotteries are reported in Appendix A of electronic supplementary material.
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4.5 Mixed attitudes
To test the predictions regarding the link between the various orders of risk aversion
and ambiguity aversion summarized in Table 1, we examine the behavior of risk-
and ambiguity averters and risk- and ambiguity seekers separately. We classify
subjects as follows. Those that choose the averse option 4 or 5 (0 or 1) out of 5 times
are considered to be averse (seeking) for both risk and ambiguity. Under this
classification, 10 subjects are classified as risk seeking and 157 are risk averse,
while 24 subjects are classified as being ambiguity seeking and 70 subjects are
ambiguity averse.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of risk-prudent and risk-temperate choices for
risk-seekers (light bars) and risk-averters (dark bars) separately. As the figure shows,
the patterns revealed in the figure broadly replicate those found by Deck and
Schlesinger (2014). That is, based on Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests, risk averters are
0
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# Ambiguity Temperate
Fig. 11 Distribution of choice behavior by ambiguity type. Note: The solid line indicates the frequency
with which a given number of choices would be expected to occur if each subjects chose randomly. Dark
(light) bars represent ambiguity averters (seekers)
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Fig. 10 Distribution of choice behavior by risk type. Note: The solid line indicates the frequency with
which a given number of choices would be expected to occur if each subjects chose randomly. Dark
(light) bars represent risk averters (seekers)
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significantly risk prudent (p-value\ 0.01) while risk seekers are not significantly so
(p-value = 0.12). However, risk averters are temperate neutral (p-value = 0.09),
while risk seekers are risk intemperate (p-value = 0.03).
A similar (mixed) pattern arises for ambiguity. Figure 11 shows the number of
ambiguity prudent and ambiguity temperate choices for the 70 ambiguity averse
subjects (dark bars) and 24 ambiguity seeking subjects (light bars) separately.
Based on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, ambiguity averters are ambiguity prudent
(p-value\ 0.01), and ambiguity temperate (p-value\ 0.01), while ambiguity
seekers are ambiguity prudent neutral (p-value = 0.16) and ambiguity temperate
neutral (p-value = 0.80).
Deck and Schlesinger (2014) and Ebert and Wiesen (2014) provide further
evidence for mixed risk averse behavior by considering the correlation of individual
behavior between tasks of different orders. In our sample, our measurement of the
degree of risk aversion is indeed positively correlated with the degree of risk
temperance (Spearman q = 0.22; p-value\ 0.01), which corroborates the findings
of Deck and Schlesinger (2014) and Ebert and Wiesen (2014). However, we also
observe a significant positive correlation between the degree of risk prudence and
the degree of risk temperance (Spearman q = 0.24; p-value\ 0.01), which is not in
line with the mixed risk aversion pattern. For ambiguity, we only observe a
significant correlation between our measurement of ambiguity prudence and
ambiguity temperance (Spearman q = 0.19; p-value\ 0.01).
Even though ambiguity models are silent about the link between risk and
ambiguity attitudes, one may wonder whether they are correlated: if subjects
consistently combine good with bad for risk and ambiguity, such a correlation
should be observed. Only the correlation between risk- and ambiguity aversion is
significantly positive (Spearman q = 0.22; p-value = 0.002). It was not different
from 0 for the higher orders.7 Previous empirical findings about the correlation
between risk and ambiguity aversion are mixed. Most studies found positive
correlations, a few negative correlations, and some no correlations at all (e.g., Sutter
et al. 2013; Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015).
To conclude, the evidence regarding the hypothesis that DMs consistently
combine good with bad for ambiguity is mixed. Even though ambiguity averters are
indeed ambiguity temperate as predicted by the pattern of mixed ambiguity
aversion, we do not observe a significant correlation between the degree of
ambiguity aversion and ambiguity temperance. A potential explanation for these
results is the fact that the preference to combine good with bad is not consistent over
probabilities; for unlikely events, the majority of subjects prefers to combine good
with good, while for likely events we observe a consistent preference to combine
good with bad. More research is needed to identify the link between a preference to
combine good with bad and ambiguity attitudes.
7 q = 0.01, p value = 0.89 for prudence; q = 0.06, p-value = 0.41 for temperance.
252 A. Baillon et al.
123
5 Discussion
In this study, we used an experiment to test for the prevalence of nonlinear
preferences towards higher order ambiguity attitudes in a sample of 199 students.
Our results show that the often-observed aversion towards ambiguity extends to
prudence and temperance, which has important implications for the descriptive
validity of assumptions underlying theoretical work on attitudes towards ambiguity.
Ambiguity, under which probabilities are unknown, opens up the possibility that
results are affected by subjects’ beliefs. In the definitions presented in Sect. 3, we
used the argument of informational symmetry, i.e., that subjects did not have any
reason to expect one color to be more likely than the other if they were not explicitly
told so. In ambiguity experiments, this concern is related to the risk of suspicion. A
subject may suspect the experimenter to voluntarily put fewer cards of the winning
color in the deck. To avoid suspicion, we made clear to subjects that they were free
to change the winning color from red to black or two similarly exchange two
ambiguous types of cards (kings and queens in Figs. 4b, 5b for instance). Only in
21% of all choices that option was ever chosen, suggesting that subjects were not
especially suspicious, and that those that were suspicious did use the opportunity to
exchange events.
Even though evidence in favor of risk prudence is strong and consistent across
studies, evidence about risk temperance is mixed. Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and
the present study observe intemperance, while other studies (e.g., Noussair et al.
2014; Deck and Schlesinger 2014) find evidence in favor of temperate behavior. A
possible explanation for risk intemperance is probability weighting, for instance as
exhibited in prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) or rank-dependent
utility (Quiggin 1981). In these models, small probabilities of high gains tend to be
overweighed. For risk prudence tasks, this effect is likely to reinforce the preference
for the prudent option, whose best outcome is always assigned a smaller probability
than the best outcome of the imprudent option. For risk temperance, the opposite
holds. By construction, the best outcome of lottery Ar4 is assigned a smaller
probability than the best outcome of lottery Br4. Hence, overweighting of small
probabilities points towards risk prudence and risk intemperance.
An alternative explanation for the mixed findings regarding temperance is that
the temperance preference is not that strong and, hence, more likely to be affected
by framing effects. The studies that have observed a strong preference for temperate
lotteries clearly frame the choice between temperate lotteries as a risk apportion-
ment task, while we present the lotteries in their reduced form. Given the theoretical
importance of risk temperance and the mixed results on its prevalence obtained in
the laboratory, more research into framing effects on higher-order risk attitudes is
warranted.
In our experiment, the evidence for ambiguity temperance is also rather weak.
This could be explained by the complexity of the tasks, which involves many
sources of ambiguity (e.g. color of the cards, Aces or Jacks, and Kings or Queens in
Fig. 3). The task was more cognitively demanding and therefore more prone to error
or random choice. From a theoretical perspective, ambiguity temperance has been
Measuring higher order ambiguity preferences 253
123
little studied but it is predicted by models like multiplier preferences (Hansen and
Sargent 2001). In real life, it may influence investment strategies in the presence of
many sources of ambiguity. For instance, if there are two possible states of the
economy and several companies whose performance is more ambiguous in one state
than in the other, an ambiguity temperate DM will compose a portfolio that does not
aggregate all ambiguities in one state.
Higher order preferences are defined by relatively complex preference condi-
tions. Our experiment, being the first to explore this domain, was designed to remain
as simple as possible. Hence, we restricted ourselves to binary choices in order to
detect the presence of higher order preferences, and refrained from using valuation
tasks. Our conclusions therefore only address the prevalence of higher order
ambiguity preferences and not to their intensity (as for instance done for higher
order risk preferences by Ebert and Wiesen 2014), which is left for future research.
6 Conclusion
Since Ellsberg’s (1961) seminal paper, ambiguity aversion has been much studied,
empirically and theoretically. Recent theoretical contributions had highlighted the
role of higher order ambiguity preferences but it remained uncertain whether people
actually exhibit such behavior. This paper is first to provide evidence of ambiguity
prudence and ambiguity temperance. By doing so, it provided support for ambiguity
models that predict ambiguity prudence. Some other ambiguity models are more
general and do not specifically predict ambiguity prudence. Our results will help
theorists fine-tune their models or help them choose specifications of those. For
instance, in the smooth model, our results support choosing a smooth ambiguity
function u with a positive third derivative.
We also elicited higher risk attitudes and could analyze how each order of
behavior correlates between risk and ambiguity and, within each domain, with the
other orders. We found some, but limited, support for mixed behavior, i.e., the
overall tendency to combine good with bad.
Finally, we have demonstrated how to measure ambiguity prudence and
temperance. The tasks we introduced can be, for instance, added to survey on
prevention behavior to better understand the role of ambiguity in prevention
behavior.
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